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ABSTRACT 
The use of disk encryption has become more prevalent in recent years. As the ability 
to encrypt a logical and physical volume becomes easier for end users, the role of examiners 
becomes more difficult when conducting digital forensics investigations. The purpose of this 
research is to provide an integrative framework, which mitigates the risks of data access loss 
when performing a digital forensic investigation. The framework will include issues of 
legality as well as whole disk encryption integrating previous frameworks. The framework 
will then be validated against several scenarios in which encryption has been used. 
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Background of the Problem 
To the general Information Technology (IT) community, whole disk encryption has 
been viewed as a means to protect and secure data. From a law enforcement and digital 
forensics perspective, the challenges could be far more serious. Investigators that require the 
analysis of digital evidence must now take into consideration whole disk encryption methods 
and applications. What is more, there has been an explosion of disk encryption integration in 
recent years as both software and hardware implementations have been released for general 
consumer use in both traditional computing devices as well as the explosive mobile market. 
The consideration of encryption issues is seen in the relevant academic literature. 
To have a meaningful discussion on whole disk encryption, the topic of encryption 
must first be examined. Unencrypted information is known as plaintext whereas encrypted 
information is known as cipher-text. Encryption is the process of making some form of 
information or data unreadable without a key. The process of encrypting information locks the 
information in an unreadable state. The only way to read or use that information is to decrypt 
it, or turn it into plain-text. The process of encryption relies on a mathematical algorithm. 
There are many various types and strengths of encryption algorithms available. Some of these 
algorithms are very strong in terms of keeping the encrypted or cipher-text from being 
decrypted through guessing or various cryptographic attacks. 
The strength of the algorithm is typically relational to the length of the encryption key 
generated. Additionally, the encryption strength is also directly related to the number of times 
the plain text is run through the algorithm. As an example, the Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) algorithm uses a key length of 128 bits, would produce the cipher-text on round 10. 
The same algorithm with the same plain text would require 12 rounds on a 192bit key and 14 
rounds on a 256bit key (FIPS-197, 2001). According to Schneier, the length of the key will 
depend entirely on the necessity and the value of the data encrypted. Different needs will 
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determine the algorithm and the key length selected to encrypted the plain-text (Schneier, 
2007, pp. 166–167). 
Although various algorithms can be used to protect data, a trend emerges when 
looking at the most common solutions for whole disk encryption. The AES standard is the 
most commonly used solution when it comes to imbedded encryption in an operating system 
as well as the most common commercial packages. Apple uses the AES-128 for the Apple 
Filevault 2 built into the OSX operating system (Apple Inc., 2012, p. 5). Microsoft Windows 
versions 7-10 uses AES with 128 or 256 bit keys (“BitLocker Drive Encryption in Windows 
7: Frequently Asked Questions,” 2012, “What’s New in BitLocker,” 2014; Lich, 2016). Red 
Hat Enterprise Linux supports the LUKS standard which operates with the AES algorithm at 
256 or 512 bit keys (Fruhwirth, 2016; Krátký et al., 2016, p. 136). These represent the major 
operating systems used today in desktop and laptop computing. The inclusion of algorithms 
like AES has complicated matters for criminal investigators working with whole disk 
encryption. 
One challenge with whole disk encryption (WDE) is that it is viewed as an anti-
forensic tool. Meaning, it is an inhibitor to digital investigations and evidence collection. 
Another challenge is investigators do not always recognize when WDE has been used. The 
failure to recognize WDE is discussed in the literature review as well as the concerns with the 
use of dual encryption. Dual encryption techniques demonstrate the possibility of presenting 
fake or misleading data as a rising challenge to digital forensics investigators. 
Traditionally, there has been a “pull the plug” approach when seizing and transporting 
a system. Removing the power to the system for seizure and transport would transition the 
system to the encrypted state, if WDE is used. The literature contains examples of 
determining the presence of cryptography and the presence of WDE, but so far, a fully formed 
framework for evidence collection has not been proposed with respect to the legality of 
encryption, issues of search and seizure, and data acquisition. 
Of particular interest in the literature regarding WDE are the calls for research on this 
subject. Garfinkel describes the issues of WDE as a threatening denial of case data to 
investigators (Garfinkel, 2010). Casey and Stellatos discuss the rise in availability of WDE as 
an embedded option in modern operating systems (Casey & Stellatos, 2008). Several authors 
have put forth various artifacts in the literature which deal with the legality and acquisition of 
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data in digital forensic investigations (Altheide, Merloni, & Zanero, 2008; Carrier & Spafford, 
2004; Ieong, 2006). What the literature lacks is design artifacts that incorporate more than key 
detection. Holistic and integrated approaches that include investigation, seizure, and legal 
issues with encryption considerations are lacking in the academic literature. Given the 
vacancy in the literature and calls for additional research, this paper will attempt to fill the 
void by presenting a design artifact for disk encryption. 
Statement of the problem 
With an increasing reliance on technology and the integration of that technology into 
the daily lives of consumers, there is a correlating increase in the recovery of technology in 
criminal investigations. In addition, there are established constitutional protections against 
illegal search and seizure as well as protections from self-incrimination. Changing privacy 
laws also complicate investigations as the court system adapts case law to changing 
technological environments. This leads to the primary research question. What considerations 
and resources are needed for the retrieval of evidence from encrypted hard disk drives in 
criminal investigations? 
Objectives of the project 
The primary purpose of this research is to provide a framework that takes into account 
the various considerations needed when conducting a digital forensics investigation in which 
WDE may be in use. These considerations include WDE, partial or protected volume 
encryption, and legal issues revolving around acquisition of data in digital investigations in 
the United States. Demonstration and evaluation of the artifact is a fundamental aspect to 
design science research. The purpose of the demonstration is to solve multiple instances of the 
identified problem (Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, & Chatterjee, 2007, p. 55). In relation 
to the issue of WDE, the artifact will be demonstrated against several common and industry 
standard scenarios. The evaluation process as described by Peffers et al. (Peffers et al., 2007, 
p. 56) will consist of artifact outcome comparison of the proposed artifact as well as other 
established frameworks discussed in the academic and best practices literature. Evaulation of 
the artifact will be based on the fifth evaluation technique proposed by Hevner et al. with 
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criminal event scenarios to demonstrate the artifact utility. If further iteration and refinement 





The literature regarding digital forensic investigations is sparse when dealing with 
WDE. The review of the literature is divided into areas of specificity with regard to WDE. 
These areas are a general discussion and calls for research in the area of WDE, deniable 
WDE, previous frameworks as digital forensic artifacts, previous methods and models as 
digital forensic artifacts, and current tools used in digital forensic investigations. The legal 
issues of discovery as well as search and seizure are discussed as part of the framework 
presented and will not be included in the review of the academic literature. 
There has been a sharp increase in the number of civil and criminal cases in the United 
States in which digital and computer forensics are discussed (Losavio & Keeling, 2011, p. 2). 
This concern becomes complicated with the inclusion of encryption of hard disk drives used 
in these legal cases. Several of these cases have gone on to create legal precedence for recent 
investigations. 
In 2006, Sebastien Boucher was investigated on charges of possession and 
transportation of child pornography into the United States from Canada. Immigration and 
Custom Enforcement (ICE) agents seized the laptop after viewing pornographic images on 
screen. Following the current law enforcement guidelines in the United States, the ICE agents 
powered down the laptop. When the laptop was powered on again, the drive containing the 
images in question was not accessible as it had been encrypted using full disk encryption. 
Boucher’s attorney argued that providing the encryption passphrase would be a violation of 
his protection against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The 
United States District Court for the District of Vermont granted Boucher’s motion to have the 
subpoena quashed in November 2007 (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Sebastien Boucher, 2007). 
On appeal, the subpoena was upheld reversing the quash motion and Boucher reached a plea 
arrangement with prosecution (United States v. Boucher, 2009).  
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The United States also sought prosecution against Thomas Kirschner for three felony 
counts of child pornography in 2009. Kirschner had already been indicted by a grand jury, and 
an additional subpoena was filed compelling Kirschner to provide any associated passwords 
to the computer in question. The files in question had been encrypted. Similar to Boucher, 
Kirschner also claimed Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. The Federal 
Magistrate at the United States District Court of Michigan Southern Division agreed that the 
compelling of password would be akin to compelled testimony being given and would be a 
violation of the defendants Fifth Amendment rights (United States v. Kirschner, 2010).  
In 2013, Ramona Camelia Fricosu had a Toshiba laptop seized by the FBI with a 
search warrant. When it was determined to be necessary, agents came back later with an 
additional warrant to search the contents of the encrypted laptop. When Fricosu’s attorney 
withheld assistance, a motion was filed to compel a copy of the drive in an unencrypted 
format. The United States then used the All Writs Act of 1789 (All Writs Act, 1789) to require 
the defendant assist with the investigation. The judge in the case upheld this and the motion 
was granted (United States v. Fricosu, 2013). Prosecution later gained access to the password 
from a list provided by Fricosu’s ex-husband, making the granted motion moot. Unlike 
previous cases, the avenue to compel here was not the same as in previous cases. Agents did 
not ask for a passphrase or encryption key, instead they focused on a compel order to deliver 
an unencrypted copy of the drive in question. By asking for the unencrypted copy as part of 
“assistance” to law enforcement, it allowed the defense counsel to choose the method of 
compliance and focuses on the outcome only. This circumvented the Fifth Amendment 
protections sought in Boucher and Kirschner.  An interesting point in this particular 
investigation is that this is one of the primary avenues that the United States District 
Attorney’s use to force decryption during an investigation by compelling assistance as 
compared to passphrases or decryption keys. 
Leon Gelfgatt was indicted in 2014 on numerous charges of felony forgery and 
larceny. The state of Massachusetts filed a motion to compel Gelfgatt to supply his password 
for various electronic devices seized by investigators. The investigators seized several 
computers after following standard operating procedure for search and seizure. Forensic 
examiners were unable to view the files as they had been encrypted with DriveCrypt Plus 
(“Drive Crypt Plus,” n.d.); the motion for compel was quashed by the judge in the case based 
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on Fifth Amendment protections. In appealing to the Massachusetts State Supreme Court, the 
prosecutors argued that the decryption would not release testimony information and reversed 
the quash motion (Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 2014). Unlike cases prosecuted at in the 
Federal District Criminal Court, this was a case in which prosecutors did not have access to 
more powerful legal tool like the All Writs Act of 1789 and had to rely on tools available to 
them at the state level. A concern becomes apparent when the current set of tools available to 
prosecution and investigators are not useful. 
In some cases, investigators cannot compel the device owners to release the 
passphrase encryption key, or provide a copy of the unencrypted information. Ray Owens, a 
resident of the Chicago suburb of Evanston, was shot and killed in June 2015 (Seidenberg, 
2015). Investigators found two smart phones with the body of Owens, an iPhone 6 and a 
Samsung Galaxy S6. Unfortunately, the phones were defaulted to the encrypted state. As state 
judge issued a warrant to order both Apple Inc. and Google Inc. to unlock the phones. Both 
companies responded that with the devices in the encrypted state, access to the information 
would be impossible (Vance, Molins, Leppard, & Zaragoza, 2015). A second case in 
Louisiana was very similar. On April 24, 2015, Brittney Mills a 29 year old of Baton Rouge 
was shot and killed along with her unborn son (Jones, 2015). Mills’ smart phone was an 
Apple iPhone and was defaulted to the encrypted state making data retrieval impossible 
according to the authorities and Apple Inc. (Maddox, 2015). In cases where the owner of the 
device is deceased or missing, key and passphrase retrieval becomes significantly more 
difficult for forensic examiners, investigators, and prosecutors. This same issue would be no 
different had the devices been fully encrypted laptops or desktops. 
This enhanced difficulty is the primary point of contention in an ongoing national 
legal battle in the United States. On February 16, 2016 the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Central District of California to 
compel the computer and electronic company Apple Inc. to assist federal agents in an ongoing 
investigation related to the mass shooting by two San Bernardino terrorists in November 
2015. At the core of the government argument is that Apple Inc. has created a device in which 
law enforcement cannot reasonably obtain evidence due to nature of device encryption and 
the protections built by Apple to unlock that encryption. Again, the United States Attorney is 
basing the request for assistance on the All Writs Act of 1789, but the concern is that the 
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assistance is very specific in nature. The FBI is asking for a revised version of the Apple 
iPhone Operating System, or iOS, without several of the security features that are publically 
available. The FBI lays out a methodical and established argument for Apple’s compliance 
(Government’s Ex Parte Application for the Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search; Memorandum of Points and Authorities, 2016).  
Apple responded both publically and on appeal by stating a larger concern of 
government intrusion into privacy and backdoors into secure devices. In the appeal, Apple 
and other companies that support Apple, are concerned about the legal precedence being set 
that would allow technology companies and manufactures to be compelled by the United 
States to break or bypass the encryption of their own secure products. One of the legal 
arguments made by Apple goes back to United States v. Fricosu, in that it is legal for the 
Government to compel a defendant in a case, but compelling a third party in a criminal case 
has never been established in case law (Apple Inc’s Motion To Vacate Order Compelling 
Apple Inc. To Assist Agents In Search, And Opposition To Government’s Motion To Compel 
Assistance, 2016). The Government has focused on the arguments that this would only apply 
to one phone; that the All Writs Act does not preclude or disallow the compelling of a third 
party to assist; and that it would not create an undue burden on Apple to produce the modified 
iOS to law enforcement (Government’s Reply In Support Of Motion To Compel And 
Opposition To Apple Inc.’S Motion To Vacate Order, 2016).While encryption is useful in 
protecting sensitive data such as health and financial information, the same technology can be 
utilized to thwart and prolong criminal prosecution as well as civil litigation. There is 
increased availability of commercial products as well as embedded FDE options in modern 
operating systems (Casey & Stellatos, 2008). Investigations in future instances will need to 
adapt to changing environments as disk encryption becomes more available. Casey et al. 
argue for increased and updated research to improve chances of evidence recovery in cases 
where WDE is utilized (Casey, Fellows, Geiger, & Stellatos, 2011). Garfinkel describes the 
rise in encryption as pervasive and complicating the process of forensic evidence (Garfinkel, 
2010, p. 66). Joshi and Bhilare call for increased artifacts for digital forensic researchers and 
practitioners (Joshi & Bhilare, n.d., p. 296). In addition to the need for improved artifacts, 
there are also calls for research to assist with deniable encryption as an anti-forensic method 
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(Canetti, Dwork, Naor, & Ostrovsky, 1997; Garfinkel, 2010; Gasti, Ateniese, & Blanton, 
2010; Grover, 2004, 2005).  
The beginnings of consistent approaches to the extraction of digital evidence can 
begin with Mocas. Mocas outlines the underlying ideologies and abstractions for evaluation 
based digital forensics research (Mocas, 2004, p. 61). Beebe and Clark expanded on this 
foundation. They understood that the investigation process was complex and dynamic. Given 
this dynamic nature, various stages would be needed to complete the fundamental architecture 
of any forensic abstraction. Multi-tiered phases and sub-phases of the investigative process 
were proposed by Beebe and Clark with the goal of synergy with related artifacts and 
frameworks present in the scholastic literature (Beebe & Clark, 2005). This allowed each 
major phase to be further expanded and developed by other researchers. This expansion and 
development can be demonstrated by Ieong and the Forensic Zachman (FORZA) framework. 
Ieong argues that the forensic process will probably include various roles in its life-cycle. The 
FORZA framework includes these roles both inside and outside traditional computing related 
disciplines. Ieong accomplishes this with the inclusion of a legal viewpoint for the 
investigator (Ieong, 2006). Although the FORZA framework does include civil and criminal 
determination, it does not include recent legal considerations for encryption during seizure or 
discovery. Trček, Abie, Skomedal, and Starc proposed a top down framework for digital 
forensics that begins with legal issues and considerations with the intent to ease the selection 
of appropriate method for investigation (Trček, Abie, Skomedal, & Starc, 2010). This 
approach, which begins with legal concerns, is interesting given the changing landscape of 
privacy and technology in the United States.  
The changing landscape of forensic investigations also includes discussion of live 
forensics. The majority of discussion regarding live forensics and disk encryption in the 
academic literature is centered on the notion of key determination and evidence acquisition. A 
primary contribution to this discussion in the literature is the Forensic Analysis Toolkit 
(FATKit) framework. The FATKit framework focuses on volatile memory and attempts to 
provide structure in the data gathered (Petroni Jr., Walters, Fraser, & Arbaugh, 2006). In 
addition to the contribution of Petroni et al. and their work on live forensics, the need to 
observe a live state is also important in digital investigations. Observing system memory 
content is crucial to determining encryption keys, passphrases, and currently running 
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processes. Chan presents a framework as Forenscope that allows investigators this level of 
observation of the machine live state but without altering memory content and jeopardizing 
the investigation (Chan, 2011).  
The underlying basis for live forensics and practitioner tools is the foundation set forth 
by artifact design in the academic literature. The literature contains numerous models and 
discussions for research in digital forensic artifact design. In 2001, the Digital Forensic 
Research Workshop (DFRW) put forth a consensus document outlining what was needed for 
the field of study in digital forensics (Palmer, 2001). Although other models existed before 
the DFRW framework, this document is considered seminal as it was established by the 
attendees and practitioners in the field (M. M. Pollitt, 2007, p. 4). The DFRW framework was 
reviewed by Reith et al. in their discussion of various models as well. Reith et al. also discuss 
the issues in the field of digital forensics at the time of publication. One of these issues was 
the lack of standardization and consistency in the tools used in the forensic process; 
something echoed by the DFRW consensus document prior (Reith, Carr, & Gunsch, 2002). 
Although the frameworks presented at DFRW conferences have been updated and modified 
as various techniques and technology have become available, there has been little to no 
inclusion of full or whole disk encryption in the various submissions. 
One of the issues of consistency plaguing digital investigations was the paradigm of 
the investigation process. Transitioning from a more traditional forensic process to a digital 
investigation process has beckoned the need for a paradigm shift on the parts of law 
enforcement, proprietary security, and contract security. There has been a need to bridge the 
distance between the traditional forensic process and the emerging dynamic of digital 
forensics. Models and frameworks that span this divide are provided in the literature with 
several major contributions by Carrier and Spafford. 
Carrier and Spafford demonstrate an integrated model designed to bridge this 
separation between the two forensic processes. They accomplish this goal by altering the 
paradigm of the crime scene from a traditional viewpoint to a digital one through the 
utilization of the computer as the crime scene. The bridging artifact was designed to support 
both security and law enforcement based investigations (Carrier & Spafford, 2003). In 
addition, Carrier and Spafford later show that the event which triggers an investigation 
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typically requires an evidence basis in order to pursue future legal criminal or civil actions 
(Carrier & Spafford, 2004).  
In addition, Carrier and Spafford later show the needs of investigators relating to event 
determination. The determination of an event that triggers a digital investigation requires an 
evidentiary basis needed for future legal action. Carrier argues that various abstraction layers 
should be used as a design artifact in the process of tool deconstruction. As tools are used in 
the forensic process, the understanding of abstraction layers within these tools will lead to 
better tool creation and development, and as an added result, better artifact creation (Carrier, 
2003).  
Baryamureeba et al. expanded upon the model put forth by Carrier and Spafford. They 
proposed the Enhanced Digital Investigation Process, an expanded model from the IDIP 
(Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004). The EDIP model includes more advanced and in-depth 
phases at each stage of the investigation. These advanced phases are a mechanism for the 
identification and collection of evidence of the primary and secondary crime scenes 
(Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004). The emphasis on the phases of an investigation process 
begins to show a need for further refinement of forensic based artifacts. 
The literature includes several additional refinements of previous artifacts. One such 
refinement was put forth by Pollit. Pollit described a modified Zachman framework developed 
at the DFRW. This modified and refined framework shows a lack of consistency on the order 
in which the phases of a digital investigation work in a time sensitive manner (M. Pollitt, 
2004). An interesting consideration to this model is the evolution of processes. Pollit argues 
that the evolution of these processes and frameworks will and must change over time as 
related technologies and their use change (M. Pollitt, 2004).  
Complementing the contribution by Pollit, Ruibin et al. also provide a modified 
framework. Ruibin et al. include knowledge and recycling of information to the proposed 
framework with the intent to reduce the complexity of investigations; specifically, in terms of 
the relevance of the case to the processes of the investigation (Ruibin, Yun, & Gaertner, 
2005). These artifacts demonstrate the natural transition of frameworks and processes from a 
theoretical basis to a more practitioner oriented paradigm. 
Part of this transition would be the inclusion of academically based artifacts into 
operational standards and guidelines. Examples of these mergers can also be found in the 
12 
literature. Kent et al. integrated forensics into a NIST standard for each phase of incident 
response to assist in torts and prosecution (Kent, Chevalier, Grance, & Dang, 2006). In 
addition, Ma et al. present a model for the obtaining of evidence that centers on the chain of 
custody, which is typically used in criminal trials to ensure the soundness of evidence 
presented to a court (Ma, Wang, Zou, & Zhang, 2011).  
While the inclusion of forensic processes into standards and frameworks is present in 
the literature, the discussion does not contain digital forensic artifacts centered on encrypted 
storage. This limitation includes the current best practices guides presented by various United 
States federal agencies. The F.B.I. Regional Computer Forensic Lab field guide for law 
enforcement has no inclusions or consideration into the possibility of encrypted data storage 
or live forensics (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007). The same lack of guidance on disk 
encryption is also seen in the United States Secret Service field guide for best practices of 
digital evidence (United States Secret Service, 2007). Only the NIJ guide contains some 
consideration to encryption, but offers no real practitioner response to the issue (National 
Institute of Justice, 2004, p. 8). As of this writing, these guides are the most current versions 




Figure 1. Current Law Enforcement Best Practices 
 
These organizations are considered elite in terms of forensic capability and expertise. 
Yet the lack of discussion regarding encryption is representative of the void in the literature 
supporting practitioners in the field. The research presented in the academic literature is 
limited to key determination and functionality of operating system embedded encryption. An 
example of this is Altheide, Merloni, and Zanero. Altheide et al. present a methodology for 
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the capture of data in a live forensics environment. In their work, the primary issue is the 
retrieval of information from an encrypted storage device with the keys predetermined or 
known in advance (Altheide, Merloni, & Zanero, 2008). This type of research artifact stands 
alone in the literature yet, it is needed by many of the organizations discussed. 
The scarce number of artifacts specifically focused on the acquisition of evidence 
from encrypted hard disk drives could be the result of several reasons. The first of these 
reasons could be the very recent rise in disk encryption. Given that the commonality of disk 
encryption has increased rapidly in the last few years, current research may not have been 
conducted in the attempt to assist law enforcement in this area. A second reason could be the 
rapid edification of privacy among consumers. After the National Security Administration 
leaks by Edward Snowden, attention to privacy and encryption in mass media became more 
common as exemplified by various news and reporting sites (Baldwin, 2013; Vance, Molins, 
Leppard, & Zaragoza, 2015). 
Within the context of these limitations and considerations, the purpose of this research 
is to expand the academic literature and meet the needs of practitioners who might conduct 
digital investigations. The goal is to provide a framework that can be used to create policy and 
procedure when dealing with encrypted hard disk drives in digital investigations. This 
framework will be then evaluated using test case scenarios to demonstrate efficacy. 
Artifact 
Case Leader Role. The overall aspect of the case leader does not change. The 
inclusion of disk encryption will possibly affect the initial participants chosen by the case 
leader at the start of the investigation. Modifying the initial participants will affect the 
investigation timeline for the case leader layer. Investigation objectives, event nature, the 
request initial investigation, investigation geography do not change but initial participants and 
investigation timeline need to be modified. 
Initial participants could include additional or optional resources familiar with WDE 
software and techniques. These people might include personnel with access to encryption 
keys in organization environments that store keys. These organizations include areas where 
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) or Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations are mandated such as educational and health care 
facilities respectively. The initial participants might also include faster interaction with 
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forensic investigators familiar with disk encryption both internal and external to the 
organization depending on the level of expertise.  
Anytime an organization requires additional expertise, training, or personnel, the 
expected investigation timeline could be altered. One method for minimizing this impact is to 
account for WDE as part of standard practice. In this regard, standard practice would include 
primary and possibly secondary personnel, contacts, or services familiar with WDE.  
System owner role. This layer remains in place but from the vantage of a victim or 
suspect being defined as the system owner. With increasing use of encryption, the system 
owner would release passphrase or decline to do so due to possible legal incrimination. The 
outlined business objectives, business and event nature, business and system process model, 
business geography, organization and participant relationships, as well as business and 
incident timeline are not modified for the purposes of WDE. 
Legal advisor role. The overall role of the legal advisor does not change. The 
discussion of this paper centers on criminal prosecution and as such, the role of the legal 
advisor is paramount to the success of the investigation overall. Legal advice should be part of 
a standard best practices and be grounded in current legal precedent. Issues regarding 
expectation of privacy, personal devices on organization networks, third party technology, 
and the very nature of a technologically changing landscape will arise.  
Legal procedures for further investigation also need to be addressed. The process and 
motivations at this layer remain as stated by Ieong but the inclusion of WDE adds a 
complexity of iteration. As an example, a warrant may be issued to search a person and their 
belongings. An investigator with access to tech-savvy legal advice would also need a warrant 
to search an electronic device seized. That warrant may need to include multiple electronic 
devices such as a smart phone, tablet, and laptop. The phase dealing with procedures for 
further investigation becomes more complex through iteration as new legal requirements may 
need to be sought and approved. Legal objectives, legal background and preliminary issues, 
legal geography, legal entities and participant, legal timeframe do not change from the 
original framework. 
Security/System architect role. The system architect role does not change, but the 
framework will be altered in terms of data and function. Motivation for the system architect 
role will remain the same in terms of objectives, but during an investigation, organizational 
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policies might be in use regarding WDE. Access to these keys will probably be restricted. 
Investigators will need to consider this aspect when dealing with organizations that use WDE. 
This aspect will be one of the considerations handled by the legal advisor actor. The security 
domain and network infrastructure, entity model, and timing will not change in scope or 
definition. 
Digital forensics specialist role. The role of the digital forensic specialist and the 
forensic investigator are often shared roles held by the same person or people. It is important 
to separate these functions as a sequence. The role of the digital forensic specialist is strategic 
in nature. The various aspects to this role often lead to specific methods to be deployed by 
investigators during search and seizure.  
The forensic investigation strategy objective is based on the needs of the case 
manager. This will include case leader and legal advisor objectives from previous layers. 
Encryption will need to be considered at this point in order to meet these objectives. In every 
digital investigation, the foundation of the investigation is the need to seize and retrieve data 
evidence. Without considering disk encryption, this fundamental need will not be met. 
The forensics data model will need to include mitigation for disk encryption. Various 
specific models can be used at this point to retrieve evidence. Regardless of the model utilized 
at this phase, WDE should be a consideration for the specialist. The model will need to be 
chosen by the specialist or investigator that best meets the needs of the case manager while 
maintaining the parameters of the strategy chosen.  
The forensics data model will have a strategy design. This selected strategy is the 
method by which the model achieves the desired result. There may be multiple methods in 
this model. As an example, a model may include a combination of live forensic tools. The 
model may include a live forensic tool with a key detector. The model may be a combination 
of collection and brute force mechanics. The data model will need to be flexible, appropriate 
for the specific case objectives, and include mitigation of WDE. 
Although forensics data geography and the forensic entity model do not change, the 
hypothetical forensic event timeline needs to be altered. This timeline will be structured and 
will be heavily dependent on the timelines of the investigator, analyst, and case manager. As 
these timelines are modified due to the use of disk encryption, so too will be the forensic 
event timeline, especially due to encryption key retrieval. This is partly due to the planning 
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and selecting of the appropriate model to be used during seizure. Additionally, there may be 
delay in obtaining or breaking the encryption key. 
Forensic investigators/system administrator/operator role. The objectives of the 
investigator are directly driven by the case leader, legal input, organization policy, and system 
owner. The objectives guiding the investigator in criminal cases will vary depending on the 
type of offense or criminal activity being investigated. The on-site forensics data observation 
layer should be based on best practices in terms of methodology. For practitioners, this will 
follow the Department of Justice and Department of Defense guidelines. For academics, this 
will follow seminal and prominent literature. An example of this would be the process set 
forth by Department of Justice in the FBI guidelines with sequential instructions. WDE will 
have been considered prior to the enactment of the model method. This aspect of the artifact’s 
design will overflow into forensic acquisition and seizure procedures as the two are closely 
tied and related. 
Seizure procedures will need to incorporate fundamental changes to the methodology. 
As stated in the forensic model design, depending on the device and various circumstances, 
the methods used for search and seizure will vary. Method modification should include 
encryption detection, key detection, and be done in a forensically sound extraction. The tools 
and process for these goals will change over time. If the investigator has a flexible model, it 
allows for variances in the seizure environment. The remaining aspects of site network 
forensics data acquisition, participants interviewing and hearing, and forensics acquisition 
timeline do not change unless directly altered by the nature of the case or from one of the 
higher roles in the framework. 
Forensic investigator/analyst role. The role of the digital forensic analyst is to 
provide criminal investigators or prosecutors digital evidence for the case. Forensic 
examination objectives are directly related to the case manager objectives. As stated earlier, in 
criminal cases this depends heavily on the nature of the crime being investigated or 
prosecuted. Once the process of decryption takes place, the major aspects to this role remain 
unchanged. Often the forensic investigator or analyst has the same function as the forensic 
investigator on site for search and seizure. Only in large law enforcement agencies are the 
analyst roles and the crime scene investigators typically split. As an example, the United 
States FBI relies on Evidence Response Teams (ERT) to secure evidence, including digital 
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devices that may contain evidence. The ERT does not analyze that evidence rather, it is 
delivered to the Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory for analysis. Often times the 
process of decryption comes at this stage. Decryption would be the only addition to this role. 
Additionally, decryption may involve an iterative sub-process with prosecution. 
Prosecutor role. The prosecutor role and functions are largely unchanged. One 
addition to the framework for prosecutors is the possibility that decryption may not be readily 
available. During the course of an investigation in the United States, defendants have 
protection against self-incrimination as given by the Fifth Amendment to the constitution. 
Releasing a pass-phrase or encryption key can be self-incriminating. One legal way to 
challenge this is for investigators or prosecutor to seek a compel order from the court to 
release the passphrase. Failure to comply with the compel order places the defendant in 
contempt of court at which point they can be incarcerated until compliance is met. Compelled 
decryption is currently debated between lower courts and the Federal District Courts of 
Appeal. As it stands at the time of this writing, if law enforcement and prosecutors can show 
the court certain circumstances exist, the decryption keys can be compelled. Once the key has 
been discovered, the process returns to the analyst layer for additional analysis. The remaining 
legal presentation objectives, attributes, procedures, jurisdiction, entities, and timeline remain 
unchanged, as prosecution will not take place until all evidence is available and an indictment 
has been returned. 
The nature of design science research is the production of a contributory artifact to the 
body of knowledge. One key element to this is the evaluation of the artifact through 
demonstration. Evaluation of the proposed artifact will take place using a criminal 
investigation in which the primary evidence source has been encrypted with WDE and the 
encryption key is unknown. The remaining narrative will discuss the outcome and conclusions 





















The methodology for this research study will adhere to a foundation in the academic 
literature. The seminal literature of design science research is the work of Hevner et al. and 
Peffers et al. (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004; Peffers et al., 2007). The basis of this is to 
systematically approach design science research with artifact creation and evaluation being a 
critical step to produce contributions to the body of knowledge. Utilizing the seven guidelines 
put forth by Hevner et al., and the Design Science Research Method (DSRM) process model 
put forth by Peffers et al., this framework will mitigate the threats to validity and rigor 
common to design science research methodology. 
The artifact creation for this research will focus on the original work setup by Ieong 
and the FORZA framework. The purpose for building on the FORZA framework is twofold. 
The first purpose is that the FROZA framework already accounts for legal issues as a primary 
contribution. This fits well given the legal nature of criminal cases in digital forensic 
investigations. Secondly, the artifact presented by Ieong is well established in the literature 
making modifications to the artifact more attractive to both academics and practitioners alike. 
The FORZA framework process flow is illustrated below. Each of the various layers will be 
expanded on as they related to the use of WDE. 
Limitations 
One of the limitations of the proposed framework is the nature of changing 
technology. Eventually, encryption algorithms and tools will evolve. Additionally, privacy 
and criminal laws may change which could render aspects of the proposed framework 
inadequate for the current function. The proposed framework will also assume only criminal 
cases in the United States where national security is not at risk. Different laws and exceptions 
are made in cases involving national security that may not apply to standard criminal cases. 
These include FISA courts and exceptions that law enforcement can make under the 
PATRIOT Act. The final limitation to this framework is the restriction of investigations to 
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traditional hard disk drives which do not include solid state drives (SSD) or NAND flash 
based drives. These are more common than other forms of storage and present more 
availability for testing. 
Demonstration 
Demonstration and evaluation of the proposed artifact will come from the use of a 
previously adjudicated criminal case. The artifact will then be executed based on the specifics 
of that criminal case. A previously adjudicated case was selected for multiple reasons. The 
first reason is that because the case has been adjudicated, or cleared from the court system, it 
is no longer a privacy concern and is an open public record. The second reason is that 
feedback from the original prosecutor and investigators regarding the framework outcome can 
be used to further refine the artifact. This accomplishes the iterative requirements set forth by 
Hevner et al. and Peffers et al. in their respective guidelines for design science research. 
Additionally, this process removes possible bias of the artifact author through the use of 
external validation by practitioners. 
 Demonstration of the artifact will be laid out with a review of the rubric used. An 
example case from the literature will then be discussed through each layer of the EnFORZA 
framework to show how the framework works in an investigation. Finally, the case used for 
demonstration will be explained per each layer and encryption consideration component. This 
example and demonstration of the artifact and the use of the rubric discussed below will meet 
the needs design science methodology as set forth by Peffers et al. (Peffers et al., 2007, p.55). 
 Rubric 
 The rubric used for validation of the framework will be based on the primary 
categories as outlined in figures 1 and 4. These components are the enhancements proposed 
by the EnFORZA framework. Each component is the adaptation of the original FORZA 
framework to include encryption considerations. The rubric has three levels of classification 
for the twelve components of the proposed framework. The highest level is the classification 
of exceptional, which is a best practices approach. At the exceptional level, components 
regarding encryption have been given consideration and includes some action or effort taken 
by the case manager and identified participants of the case. 
 The second level of classification is the acceptable level. At the acceptable level, 
encryption concerns and practices are being considered, but may not be acted upon by the 
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case manager or identified participants. This lack of action may be for a number of reasons. In 
some cases there may be a lack of personnel or human talent and resources. There may be a 
lack of financial resources or a lack of basic technology and infrastructure. Additionally, the 
encryption component may be considered, but not acted upon due to appropriateness of the 
case.  
 The third level is the unacceptable level. This level shows the need for reflection on 
the practices used by the case manager and controlling agency. If the encryption component is 
graded at this level, little to no consideration to the complications that encryption can add to 
the investigation and case have been made. This can increase the time it takes to adjudicate 
the case successfully. Each level and corresponding component can be viewed in table 1.  
 The first component is the identification of participants that may have access to 
encryption keys. At the exceptional level, the case manager has identified participants that 
may have access to encryption keys. With the identification of participants with this access, 
the case can proceed much more quickly should encryption be found to be in use. This will 
typically be the system owner in terms of the proposed framework. In larger environments, 
this could be an information technology manager or chief technology officer. At the 
acceptable level, consideration to encryption is given but no participants available with access 
to encryption keys or passphrases. The reason for lack of participants could be for several 
reasons including no identified system owner, no available system owner, or a lack of 
cooperation with the system owner. For criminal cases the last two can be common as 
discussed in the literature where cases have a deceased system owner or one that is going 
through the process of investigation and enacting legal rights. At the unacceptable level, there 
has been no consideration or identification of participants that may have access to encryption 
keys or passphrases. This is different from the previous levels in that consideration of 
encryption keys was part of the procedure for progressing with the investigation. At this level 
though, encryption is not a consideration at all. This can slow the investigation, prosecution, 
and adjudication significantly at later stages. 
 The second component is the identification of participants that may have forensic 
experience. At the exceptional level, there will be direct interaction with participants that have 
previous forensic experience. This may be a forensic expert on staff or through a vendor. 
There will be some amount of resource given to this component at this level in order to ensure 
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that an investigation can continue successfully. At the acceptable level, consideration is given 
but there are no participants available with previous forensic experience. This is a resource 
issue for the case manager and organization. While the desire to have access to someone with 
previous experience may be present, the lack of personnel, lack of training, or simply location 
all may play a part in keeping this from realization. At the unacceptable level, there has been 
no consideration given to previous forensic experience. This is a concern due to the issue that 
evidence may be obtained and not done so in a sound manner. Having no ability to rely on the 
experience of forensic personnel may compromise the case as a whole. It may jeopardize the 
ability to obtain information and evidence later in a worse case or prolong the case 
unnecessarily.  
 The next component to the rubric scores if encryption is part of the agency standard 
operating procedures. At the exceptional level, WDE is considered and expanded as part of 
the standard operating procedures for the department or agency in question. The consideration 
aspect of this would be that the case manager will consider that encryption could be in use, 
while at the same time preparing the evidence acquisition and forensic personnel that 
encryption may be in use, expanding by the preparation of other participants. At the 
acceptable level, encryption is considered, but there is no action or preparation by the case 
manager as part of standard procedures. At the unacceptable level, there is no consideration of 
encryption as part of standard procedures. This is an issue due to the possibility of prolonging 
the seizure, analysis, and investigation. By not considering encryption as part of standard 
procedures, the process of the investigation would need to be stopped or paused while some 
aspect dealing with encryption is handled. While this is not avoidable at all times due to 
varying circumstances, the risk of time, resources, and evidence being lost are reduced or 
mitigated. 
 Obtaining legal advice from the legal participant is paramount to a successful 
investigation. The legal layer of the proposed framework handles one of the most critical 
aspects of any investigation. The legal advice can be worked into standard procedures, but 
there should still be some aspect of legal counsel, be it internal to the organization or a 
partnership with another group such as a prosecutor in terms of a criminal investigation. In 
dealing with legal advice and technology, and as the case discussed earlier with Apple Inc. 
and the US FBI, there are many facets that a case manager will have to handle. These include 
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privacy expectations, business and personal devices, third party technology, and warrants 
specific to encryption. 
 The first legal component is advice regarding privacy expectations. Often times there 
is an expectation of privacy afforded to people in the United States. This expectation is not 
always absolute. There are many circumstances in which the expectation of privacy is 
suspended. This can occur on organization or work related computers and devices. The 
expectation of privacy can also be suspended once the information in question transverses a 
network out of the control of the system owner. Seeking advice on the scope of privacy 
expectations can lead to faster evidence recovery, alternate evidence gathering vectors, and 
proper probable cause in situations which may be more complicated such as work related 
machines or servers. At the exceptional level, the legal advice regarding expectation of 
privacy is not only sought, but utilized in the best manner possible given the nature and 
specifics of the investigation and case manager needs. At the acceptable level, the legal advice 
is considered, but either no action was taken or no action was needed. This lack of action 
should not be taken to mean anything other than a lack of resources or a lack of need. At the 
unacceptable level, there has been no consideration to the expectation of privacy. This will 
probably lead to additional subpoenas for information, additional motions proving to a court 
and a judge that privacy is not infringed, among possible others. This prolongs the 
investigation and continues to spend human and financial resources which could be mitigated 
or reduced through initial preparation. 
 Legal advice should also be sought regarding the issues involved with personal and 
business devices. This consideration is necessary in two primary ways. The first is linked to 
privacy issues. If a device is owned by an organization, then the organization may have 
suspended the right or expectation of privacy. Many organizations will cooperate fully with 
law enforcement upon the production of proper legal documents. If the device is a personal 
device, such as a laptop, operating in an organizational environment, then the issue becomes 
more difficult. The organization has no obligation to produce the device, and may have no 
legal ability to cooperate. This is only a small example of how things can become complicated 
as the division of organizational and private devices have merged over the last twenty years.  
Other issues related to private and business devices are often overlooked. Some 
systems and devices are considered critical to business operations. Business that need to 
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maintain operational status can still be served with a warrant to search and seize. Consider 
servers with traditional hard disks running patient information at a hospital. In this scenario, 
the ability to see patients and care for them may over-rule an asset seizure. In cases like this, 
knowing and preparing ahead of time will limit the impact to the organization or system 
owner. The exceptional grade for this component would consider the paradigm of personal 
and business devices and utilize that information in the best manner possible. At the 
exceptional level, this legal advice is considered, but there is no action taken. Again, this may 
be to the lack of need by the case manager. While the unacceptable level denotes that no 
consideration is given to the private or business nature of the device. This complicates the 
investigation by prolonging the time it takes to move forward and any associated human or 
financial costs. 
In dealing with third party technology, legal advice is paramount to not only the case 
manager’s needs, but the way that an investigation can move forward. As the FBI v. Apple 
Inc. case has noted, the understanding of third party technology can become complicated and 
time consuming. Unless the case manager or forensic expert is fluent in all technology, which 
is unlikely, considerations for newer technology or custom devices becomes paramount. If the 
forensic expert has no previous knowledge about the computer then getting legal advice may 
prove valuable, but this complicates the investigation from a legal standpoint. Any outside 
expert would need to be contracted or granted some type of authority to act on behalf of the 
investigative organization, or at least acting under the supervision of an agent of that 
organization. 
As an example, consider an organization running traditional servers with traditional 
hard disks. Servers may run custom operating systems, or at least less common one that the 
forensic expert may be more accustomed. Sometimes it is necessary to get the assistance of an 
outside expert in various operating systems and file systems to ensure no loss of data or 
evidence. This becomes even more complicated with the inclusion of blade devices that have 
dedicated hard drives but operate as a combined unit or storage. Some of these devices are 
simply too large to seize or may be business critical. 
Given these issues, the exceptional grade for this component shows consideration of 
the issues possible by the case manager. Additionally, the case manager may pull or request 
various resources or expertise to accomplish the goal needed for the investigation to continue. 
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At the acceptable level, the legal advice is sought but there may not be any additional 
expertise needed, requiring no additional legal considerations. At the unacceptable level, there 
has been no consideration to third party technology. This complicates the investigation, as 
well illustrated by the dispute between Apple and the FBI, by prolonging the length of time it 
takes to retrieve evidence and continue the investigation process. 
The last consideration from a legal advice perspective is the issue of warrants. Due to 
the way the justice system works in the United States, police cannot search the content 
computer without consent or without a warrant. Knowing ahead of search and seizure will 
assist the case manager in terms of putting the best warrant to a judge. Because encryption 
complicates the issue of seizure, assuming that the device is encrypted may allow for warrants 
to be prepared ahead of time for compelling encryption key or passphrase release. If there is 
enough probable cause for a search warrant, and given the state of encryption use today, there 
is likely enough probable cause to request passphrases and encryption keys. The exceptional 
level of this component is best illustrated in the same such manner. At this level, the legal 
advice regarding encryption for seizure in the warrant writing process is used to prepare or 
include encryption keys or passphrases.  
At the acceptable level, the consideration for encryption keys and passphrases is 
given, but no action is taken at the time the warrant is prepared. One thing to consider at this 
point in the process is the judge. Law enforcement often, over time develop a working 
relationship with magistrates that sign off on warrants. If the investigator feels that the 
warrant may or may not be rejected, this aspect may not be included. There may also be a lack 
of probable cause for the warrant to include encryption as a consideration. At the 
unacceptable level, no consideration to encryption, either keys or passphrases, was given 
during the warrant writing process. This level prolongs the investigation through the need to 
obtain additional warrants or compel motions to access computing devices. Additionally, if 
the secondary or follow-up warrants have little that meets the standard for a judge, then the 
warrant can be rejected as a 5th Amendment protection as seen in the Boucher case (United 
States v. Boucher, 2009). If the warrant for encryption keys or passphrases is not obtained, 
there is not another option, the criminal case may be dropped. Fortunately, there are 
alternatives to the reliance of warrants alone. Forensic expertise and tools play a large role in 
accessing data that can be encrypted. 
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One of these tools available to the forensic expert participant is live forensics. Live 
forensics are typically software and hardware tools that allow an investigator to access 
evidence on a machine, in a forensically sound manner, while the machine is in operation or 
“live”. These types of tools have become useful in that the data or evidence in question can be 
obtained before the system is powered off, resulting in the possibility of an encrypted state 
hard disk. There is a large availability of commercial and open-source live forensics suites on 
the Internet. The training to use such tools is still an issue for many law enforcement agencies, 
but availability itself does not present a challenge to investigators. For the component of 
facilitating live forensic processes, the exceptional level includes the use of live forensics at 
all possible levels of seizure. This does not include instances where the machine is already 
powered off. The acceptable level of live forensics is instanced where live forensics are 
considered, but not used. This could be due to the machine already being in the powered off 
state. Also, the forensic expert utilized may have limited experience in using live forensics, as 
training for that organization may be an issue. At the unacceptable level, live forensics is not a 
consideration at all. If the machine is currently powered on, there may be crucial evidence in 
the system memory or in part of the hard disk used for memory swap. Without live forensics, 
investigators may lose data that could be used in an investigation, either prolonging the 
investigation or ending it. 
Another issue for investigators during the process of evidence seizure is key detection. 
While software for detecting encryption keys is still in the beginning stages of large scale use, 
in the future this will be a necessary tool for forensic investigators. The premise of key 
detection is the location of encryption keys in system memory. If the key or passphrase is 
found in system memory, the device can be decrypted at a later stage once powered off. This 
type of option could in many ways save large amounts of legal hurdles if utilized through the 
live forensics process. At the acceptable level, the detection of encryption keys or passphrases 
is used in all qualifying or appropriate seizures. Adding this to a standard operating procedure 
could save future investigations large amounts of time, especially if the same passphrase has 
been used in multiple locations or devices. At the acceptable level, the case manager or 
forensic expert takes into consideration key detection but takes no action. In these instances, 
the forensic expert may not have the required software, the machine may be powered off, or 
the investigation may call for something more appropriate. At the unacceptable level, there is 
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no consideration given to key detection. As stated prior, this makes off scene decryption more 
difficult for the investigation, prolonging the time to reach a case outcome. 
Decryption is the next critical component. Decryption is the process by which 
encrypted data, or cipher-text, is translated into unencrypted data or plain text. Decryption is 
the stage at which the data seized can be used in the prosecution of a criminal case. Although 
it may seem normal to conclude that decryption would be part of the logical process of an 
investigation, decryption is sometimes overlooked as an integral part of evidence collection 
and analysis. Everything thus far in the proposed framework up to this component has 
revolved around retrieving decrypted or unencrypted information from a hard disk through 
obtaining encryption keys, passphrases, or capturing data before it leaves the decrypted state. 
Without the process of decryption, there may be evidence that cannot be accessed and utilized 
in the investigation. At the exceptional level, decryption has been considered either directly or 
through one of the many options in previous components and is a viable option, meaning that 
evidence could be retrieved. At the acceptable level, decryption is considered but not 
necessarily viable. A good example of these instances would be the system owner is unable to 
provide a passphrase or encryption key due to death or some other incapacitation. Another 
issue may be that although possible, the length of time it would take to brute force the 
decryption, typically the process of trying all possible passphrase permutations, would take 
too long for the investigation timeline. In these instances, which can be common, 
consideration is given to decryption, but it may not be viable. At the unacceptable level, there 
has been no consideration given to decryption. This can cause delays in the process as 
investigators would have to return to a previous stage to determine or obtain decryption 
information such as encryption keys or pass phrases in order to continue the investigation. 
These delays can be costly in terms of human and financial resources.  
The last component is the use of motions by the prosecution. The use of additional 
motions are necessary as obstacles in the case may hinder the progress of the prosecution. 
These obstacles may include privacy issues, self-incrimination protections, or simple lack of 
cooperation. These obstacles may be overcome legally through the use of additional motions. 
By considering encryption and the associated complications that are associated with its use, 
motions can be preliminarily prepared and ready for filing with the court. At the exceptional 
level, the case manager has requested the appropriate participant to preliminary prepare 
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motions overcoming traditional obstacles when dealing with encryption. At the acceptable 
level, these motions are not preliminarily prepared but are considered when needed. While 
this is acceptable, it is not ideal as the motions may take additional time and efforts. At the 
unacceptable level, there has been consideration to prosecutorial motions related to encryption 
or associated complications. This can be detrimental to the case as a whole. If the obstacle 
cannot be overcome through a legal means, then the case charges can be dropped or 
withdrawn. Preliminary preparation, at some level, can assist and bring the case to an 
adjudication with reduced risk.  
The rubric discussed previously is represented at each component and each grade level 
by Table 1. This rubric, along with the proposed framework will be used to discuss a case as a 
demonstration of the framework per the requirement made by Hevner et al. 
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Table 1: EnFORZA Rubric 
Components Exceptional Acceptable Unacceptable 
Identify participants that 
may have access to 
encryption keys 
Participants with possible 
access to encryption keys 
or passphrases identified.  
Consideration given but 
no participants available 
with access to encryption 
keys or passphrases. 
No consideration or 
identification of 
participants that may 
have access to encryption 
keys or passphrases. 
Identify participants that 
may have forensic 
experience 
Participants with previous 
forensic experience 
sought and consulted. 
Consideration given but 
no participants available 
with previous forensic 
experience. 
No consideration to 
forensic experience given. 
Whole Disk Encryption 
part of Standard 
Procedures 
WDE is considered and 
expanded as part of 
standard procedures 
WDE is considered part of 
standard procedures 
No Consideration given to 
encryption 
Legal advice on privacy 
expectations 
Legal advice is sought and 
examined as part of 
privacy expectations. 
Advice is utilized in best 
manner possible. 
Legal advice considered 
for privacy expectations 
No consideration given to 
legal advice on privacy 
expectations  
Legal advice on business 
/personal devices 
Legal advice is sought and 
examined as part of 
business and personal 
devices. Utilizing any 
information in best 
manner possible. 
Legal advice considered 
for business / personal 
devices during the seizure 
process 
No consideration given to 
legal advice on 
business/personal devices 
Legal advice on third party 
technology 
Legal advice considered 
for third party technology. 
Additional resources or 
expertise sought. 
Legal advice is considered 
for third party technology 
No consideration given to 
legal advice on third party 
technology 
Legal advice on warrants 
involving encryption 
Encryption considered in 
use during warrant writing 
process. 
Encryption considered 
during the warrant writing 
process. 
No consideration given to 
legal advice on warrants 
involving encryption 
Live forensics processes Live forensics used in all 
possible instances of 
seizure.  
Live forensics considered, 
but not used. 
No consideration given to 




acted upon in all 
qualifying seizures 
Encryption determination 
is considered at seizure 
but not acted upon 
No consideration given to 
encryption determination 
at seizure 
Key detection at seizure Key detection acted upon 
in all qualifying seizures 
Key detection considered 
but not acted upon 
No consideration given to 
key detection at seizure 
Decryption considerations Decryption is considered 
and viable  
Decryption is considered 
but not viable 
No consideration given to 
decryption considerations 
Prosecutorial Motions Additional prosecutorial 
motions are considered 
and preliminary prepared 
for possible filing with the 
court.  
Additional prosecutorial 
motions are considered.  
No consideration given to 
prosecutorial motions 





RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
To demonstrate the proposed framework in a manner that meets the criteria set forth 
by Hevner et al., the case United States v. Fricosu (2011) will be used from the literature 
review. Each layer of the proposed framework will be demonstrated through the use of this 
case proof in three manners. The first manner will describe the original case as it is available 
from the documentation. This will be followed by the use of the proposed framework to 
obtain a more favorable or more efficient outcome. Finally, the rubric discussed in chapter 3 
will be used to evaluate the use of the proposed framework. The demonstration and evaluation 
of the proposed framework with the Fricosu case meets the design science requirements set 
forth by Peffers et al in their methodology. Peffers et al. state that the demonstration will fall 
under Activity 4 which includes the use of simulation or case proof to solve at least one 
instance of the problem identified (Peffers et al., 2007, p.55). Additionally, the authors list 
Activity 5, the evaluation, which should measure how well the artifact assists the problem 
solution. These are represented by the application of the framework in narrative and the use of 
the rubric respectively. 
Case Background 
The FBI searched the home of Ramona Fricosu after a Federal Grand Jury indicted her 
on charges of real estate fraud in May 2010. During the execution of the warrant, Federal 
agents on the FBI Evidence Retrieval Team seized several computers, storage devices, and 
most importantly a Toshiba M305 Laptop. During evidence analysis, the FBI attained an 
additional search warrant to search the laptop contents. When the laptop was searched 
specifically pursuant to the second warrant, the government agent discovered the laptop was 
encrypted with PGP full disk encryption.  
The United States Government then filed a motion using the All Writs Act of 1789 to 
compel Fricosu to aid the investigation by making the unencrypted contents available through 
any means that the defendant and her counsel decided. After several counter motions and an 
additional amicus brief was filed on behalf of the court, a list of previous passwords was 
34 
delivered to law enforcement by Fricosu’s ex-husband. In July 2013, almost two years after 
the motion to compel, Fricosu entered a plea arrangement with United States Prosecution in 
which she was forfeit a vehicle, $10,233 cash seized during the initial warrant, and $912,038 
in summary judgement. 
Applied Framework 
Applying the proposed EnFORZA framework to the example case of United States v. 
Fricosu begins with the case leader. The primary encryption consideration of the Fricosu case 
is that encryption was not a concern until after the laptop was seized and analysis had begun. 
The Case Leader in this case did not give encryption a consideration during the planning and 
seizure phases of the investigation. As the case leader gave no consideration to encryption, the 
process was stalled later while investigators relied on legal means to, unsuccessfully obtain 
the encryption key or passphrase. 
Based on this description, the component of identifying participants would be rated as 
unacceptable on the validation rubric. If the case leader had considered encryption from the 
start of the investigation as a possibility, the scoring of the identification component could be 
improved. By considering encryption at the onset, the participants with access to the 
encryption keys or passphrases would have identified Fricosu and her ex-husband. This 
identification would have moved the component rubric from unacceptable to exceptional. If 
the case leader had given consideration to encryption, yet not identified possible participants 
with access to encryption keys or passphrases, the case outcome would not have changed at 
this stage in the investigation, but the grade on the rubric would have changed to the 
acceptable level. 
The second component, identify participants that may have previous forensic 
experience, remains unchanged for this example case. The investigation was handled by FBI 
agents during seizure. The FBI Evidence Recovery Teams are some of the foremost experts in 
forensic techniques and experience. Given the nature of the investigation and the level of 
expertise involved, the rubric would be at the exceptional level for this component. 
The next component, whole disk encryption is part of standard operating procedures, 
would be graded at the unacceptable level. The reasoning for this is found by the reaction of 
the investigators. The use of whole disk encryption was not discovered until the forensic 
analysis phase of the investigation. Discovery of whole disk encryption, if part of a standard 
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operating procedure, would begin with some initial encryption detection. The Fricosu case 
shows that encryption was not considered at all as part of any standard procedure through the 
simple failure of early detection. This process will vary by case and environment, but the 
decision to use some form of encryption detection, if appropriate for that specific case, would 
show that encryption had been considered as part of standard operating procedures. 
The fourth component, legal advice regarding privacy expectations, would be graded 
at the acceptable level for the Fricosu case. In this instance, privacy was considered through 
the normal legal process of obtaining a warrant. Warrants in the United States must be worded 
specifically when presented to a magistrate or judge for signing. When presented for approval, 
a warrant must outline specifically when the warrant will be served, where the warrant will be 
served, what will be searched, and what is to be seized as evidence. There are methods that 
law enforcement can use to allow flexibility. As an example, a warrant might suggest any 
electronic computing devices. This level of vagueness allows law enforcement flexibility to 
seize various devices such as computers, laptops, console gaming systems, and smart phones. 
Privacy concerns are protected by the warrant writing and approval process. Because the 
actual warrant was unavailable for open records, the rubric level must stay at the acceptable 
level with the basic privacy expectations considered under the warrant review process. 
The need for legal advice regarding business and personal devices was also given 
consideration during the warrant writing and approval process. For the Fricosu case, the 
warrant was served to search the Fricosu personal home. Although this may have been a home 
office of the defendant, it was not a third party office where Fricosu worked as an employee. 
Given this environment, the consideration was given to the nature of personal devices in the 
home. This would put the grade of acceptable for this component. If there had been a need to 
search a business or third party component, then additional search warrants would have been 
sought for locations other than the home of Fricosu. 
In searching a business or organization, there is also a need to consider third party 
technology. Although the Fricosu case did not contain third party technology, the need is 
dependent on the environment and situation. If investigators are serving a warrant to a 
business and are unfamiliar with the environment, technology, or operations, severe damage 
can be done to both the evidence desired and the organization’s ability to operate. Third party 
technology may be as simple as bladed servers, virtual machines like Amazon’s Elastic 
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Compute, or cluster computing. These are not standard technologies and require specialized 
skills and knowledge. The case manager must decide if and how to bring those resources to 
the investigation. In the Fricosu case, there was no direct need for third party considerations 
warranting the rubric grade at the acceptable level as there was no documentation to support 
an unacceptable score. 
The next component is the need for legal advice involving encryption. The grade for 
this component is unacceptable. The reasoning for this grade is the nature of the analysis. The 
warrant, if written with consideration to encryption, would have allowed law enforcement to 
search the residence for indications of passphrases. Passphrases are sometimes written on 
pieces of paper or stored in notebooks. A warrant with this consideration would allow the 
agents during the seizure to search for these documents. If the agents had been allowed to do 
this directly, the grading rubric would move from unacceptable, to the acceptable level. If 
encryption had been assumed to be in use, then not only would the warrant have consideration 
for encryption keys and passphrases, but there could be some action taken during seizure, 
possibly shortening the outcome of the investigation and moving the rubric to exceptional. 
Following the legal considerations is the use of live forensics during seizure. Live 
forensics is not appropriate in all circumstances or environments. If the target device is 
already powered off, then typically law enforcement simply seizes the device as evidence. 
Live forensics requires the machine to be in a powered on state so that the software being run 
can determine processes that are running, files that are open, and the contents of memory. One 
key aspect to live forensics is the observation of the contents of the random access memory 
(RAM). The use of live forensics is an important aspect to the considerations of encryption 
during an investigation. Live forensics can assist with encryption determination and key 
detection. For the Fricosu case, live forensics was not used as is determined by the forensic 
analysis report. If live forensics had been used, or in this particular case, had been appropriate 
to use, encryption might have been detected before the end of the seizure process. It in 
unknown if the computer seized in the Fricosu case was powered on or off at the time of 
seizure, but encryption may or may not have been considered. The grade of acceptable would 
be given to this consideration on the rubric due to the unknown power state of the laptop as 
live forensics may have been an option, but inappropriate at the time. 
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A second aspect in which live forensics can be used is the determination of encryption 
use. Live forensics can determine the processes running in memory. This includes 
applications and processes related to whole disk encryption software. If the processes related 
to whole disk encryption can be detected early, then investigators can save time and effort in 
the case during analysis by obtaining as much data as possible prior to the device being 
powered down and reverting to the encrypted state. In the Fricosu case, it is unclear if live 
forensics was available to the agents during search and seizure, given that the machine may 
have already been powered down. In this particular instance, the best grade to give would be 
acceptable, as consideration to encryption may have been given. However, if the machine was 
in a powered down and encrypted state, live forensics, and therefore encryption determination 
would be inappropriate. 
Key detection is also dependent on the use of live forensics during search and seizure. 
Key detection software can be part of a live forensics package and is used to obtain 
encryption keys or passphrases in system memory. If key detection can be used as part of the 
investigation process, obtaining additional warrants and compel orders may not be necessary 
as the investigators and prosecution may have everything needed to view evidence. This can 
reduce the time needed for the investigation and prosecution of any possible criminal charges. 
Due to the uncertain nature of the investigation in the Fricosu case regarding the use of live 
forensics, it remains unclear if key detection was considered. Given this circumstance, the 
rubric grade should be marked as acceptable based on the situational nature in the use of live 
forensics. 
The determination of the use of encryption as well as passphrase and key detection are 
useful in the goal of decrypting the evidence, sometimes without the passphrase or key. This 
process can be achieved through various techniques. One such technique is a “brute force” 
attack. This type of attack, also known as an exhaustive key search, attempts every possible 
key permutation and can be commonly successful against weaker encryption algorithms. 
Some commercial forensics packages offer a decryption attack based variations of the brute 
force method. This can be through common or pre-generated lists of passphrases that are 
available on the Internet for download. If decryption has not been considered prior to seizure 
or during the analysis, there remains the possibility of a longer investigation process. In the 
Fricosu case, the decryption considerations remain unclear. The documents provided to the 
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court only show that during the forensic analysis, whole disk encryption was determined by 
the loading screen. There is no direct mention of decryption steps taken in the notes and the 
process may have been considered but deemed non-viable. Although the rubric grade here 
would be acceptable, the lack of notation regarding decryption may cause difficulties. If 
asking later to compel a defendant or third party, the prosecution may have to show that all 
viable and available options have been exhausted to a court.  
Compel orders are motions before a court of law in the United States. They are one of 
many types of motions and are used to ask a judge or magistrate to force a person to comply 
with a request of the court made on behalf of the prosecution or defense in a criminal case. In 
the Fricosu case, additional prosecutorial motions were used to compel compliance with the 
search of the laptop with whole disk encryption. The rubric grade for the Fricosu case would 
be acceptable as there was an additional search warrant for the laptop contents and a compel 
motion to assist investigators under the All Writs Act of 1789. This will vary between the 
United States Government and the Individual States as to the nature of additional motions. 
The states do not have access to the same laws that the Federal Government can utilize in an 
investigation. As an example, the states cannot use the All Writs Act in order to compel 
assistance. Prosecution can accelerate the process by giving consideration to these motions 
prior to their absolute need. Preliminarily preparing motions for filing with the court can 
reduce the time needed for the prosecution to move forward, and reduce the time needed to 
adjudicate the case. 
Findings 
 In discussing the example case of United States v. Fricosu, there is room for 
improvement regarding the process of a forensic investigation with consideration to whole 
disk encryption. In the example case, the tally was 1 exceptional, 6 acceptable, and 3 
unacceptable scores on the rubric. When discussing the challenges at each level, significant 
improvements can be made regarding the use of whole disk encryption. The improvements 
can be noted with the comparison of Table 2, where the original case does not use the 
proposed framework, and Table 3, where the case has the framework applied as discussed 
prior. The improvements most significant were; the identification of participants that may 
have access to encryption keys, whole disk encryption part of standard procedures, and 
seeking legal advice on warrants involving encryption. Each of these, when addressed based 
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on the court records would move from the unacceptable level to the exceptional level. 
Excluding the component of identifying participants that may have previous forensic 
experience, the remaining eight components would move from the acceptable to 
exceptionable based on the court records obtained and the discussion prior. These remaining 
eight components show a moderate improvement in the processes used.  
It can be demonstrated from the case discussion that without any considerations, 
adjudication of the criminal case will take longer. By giving consideration to each of the 
components in the proposed framework, the adjudication process can be demonstratively 
reduced through prior planning and methodical execution of the proposed framework. These 
improvements can show reduced time in evidence seizure, forensic data recovery, and 




Table 2: Fricosu without EnFORZA 
 
 











There is an increase in the use and availability of encryption in today’s consumer and 
commercial technology through both the integration with modern operating systems as well as 
an increase in overall awareness of encryption. There have also been changes to both legal 
and law enforcement practices involving the search and seizure of evidence which may 
include data that is encrypted. There are also increased privacy concerns given the level of 
integration and connectivity to the Internet today. While a useful tool to protect against 
common crimes like identity theft and identity fraud, the whole disk encryption of traditional 
hard disk drives remains a hindrance for law enforcement agencies investigating criminal 
cases in the United States. 
This issue has been discussed in the academic literature and demonstrated in relevant 
criminal cases. The academic literature includes specific calls for research on this topic and 
the legal cases presented in the literature review show that the use of whole disk encryption is 
still a relevant research topic. The literature also shows that current law enforcement best 
practices are behind in the considerations for the use of whole disk encryption. Additionally, 
there is some evidence in the literature and legal cases that whole disk encryption is being 
used beyond the scope of privacy protection as an anti-forensic tool. 
The purpose of this research is three-fold. The first is to directly answer the calls for 
research discussed in the literature review. These calls are academic in foundation and discuss 
the direct impact to practitioners and law enforcement. The second purpose is to expand the 
body of Information System (I.S.) knowledge through an applicable methodology. The third 
purpose of this research is to provide an artifact that can assist law enforcement in the United 
States in the investigation and prosecution of criminal acts in which whole disk encryption 
has been used. In the proposed research, all three of these components are met. 
This research directly answers the calls set forth by Garfinkel as well as Casey et al. 
discussed in the extant scholarly I.S. literature. The expansion of the I.S. knowledge base is 
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accomplished through a completed design science artifact following the requirements set forth 
by Hevner et al. and Peffers et al. in their respective guides and methodologies regarding 
design science. Lastly, the proposed research artifact demonstrates a systematic manner in 
which practitioners can improve process time to a desired outcome. This proposed artifact is 
the focus of the discussion and findings, as well as, implications for practitioners and future 
research on the subject of whole disk encryption. 
Discussion of Findings 
The goal of any Information Systems based research is to contribute to the I.S. body of 
knowledge. The main contribution to the body of I.S. knowledge is the proposed EnFORZA 
artifact. EnFORZA provides a much needed update to the knowledge, practices, and 
considerations needed by practitioners in the use and mitigation of risk dealing with whole 
disk encryption in criminal cases. The artifact proposed also has research and scholarly based 
application as it can be further refined through the design science methodology for 
improvement over time as technology and laws change in the United States. 
The artifact has a practitioner focus in that law enforcement and prosecutors can apply 
the considerations given in the artifact to internal processes and procedures. If the artifact is 
applied at the agency or organization level, improved operating procedures can be 
implemented to reduce the time needed to indict, prosecute, and adjudicate a criminal case. If 
the artifact is applied at the case level, it can be used to meet the needs of an agency or 
investigator on micro-level tailoring the considerations on a per-legal case basis as 
demonstrated in the Fricosu case. This shows that the framework is flexible and allows for 
application across a broad spectrum of practitioners in the United States. 
Limitations 
With any scholarly research, there will be limitations to the study. The proposed 
EnFORZA framework has some limitations discovered in the process of refinement and 
evaluation. The first limitation is that the demonstration case was representative only to the 
Federal level, which has different actions of recourse than those available to the States. The 
United States government has legal and investigative resources that are not shared by the 
states. As such, this is a limitation of the study in that no demonstration of the proposed 
framework was done at the state level. Demonstration of the artifact at the State level should 
be done as part of additional iteration and refinement of the artifact. 
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As a result, not all case documentation was available. The search warrant was not 
made available to the court in the Fricosu case. Although the examiners’ forensic notes are 
available, the seizing of evidence plays a critical role in encryption cases. At the state level, 
two cases were identified that met the requirements of the proposed research in Texas and 
Arizona.  In the Texas case, a request for assistance and open records was attempted multiple 
times, but agreements with local agencies were not available in regards to this publication. 
The second criminal case with the necessary requirements was identified in the state of 
Arizona, but the court documentation was not complete at the time of the evaluation activity. 
In order to proceed with more clarity, these documents would need to be available. Having all 
documentation available from the court and the investigators, which act as separate entities 
and agencies, will be useful and more informative in further refining of the research artifact. 
With more complete documentation, a demonstration at the state level can be made. 
Implications for Practice 
As discussed earlier, there are many implications for practitioners in using this 
framework for law enforcement, investigations, and prosecution. The primary contribution of 
the framework is to improve processes and procedures related to search and seizure, 
investigation, and analysis of encrypted evidence. The artifact can be used to streamline 
processes involved with the planning of evidence seizure where encryption could be in use. 
Agencies and organizations that can streamline the process of investigating a case can more 
easily determine the primary considerations needed for obtaining a successful adjudication. 
Evidence that may be encrypted in a case like Fricosu will have increased time and resources 
in reaching a successful prosecution or case adjudication. A reduction in resources could 
mean a reduction in the number of cases that go to trial, which is a costly option to the state 
and federal governments. Reducing the resources needed will also allow for higher conviction 
rates through the use of plea arrangements and possibly higher adjudication rates in cases 
where there is no guilt. The case will not be extended as long in either guilty or not-guilty 
verdicts. The artifact can also be used to assist law enforcement agencies develop a standard 
operating procedure for criminal cases involving traditional hard disk drives and the use of 
encryption technologies. 
Encryption cases can also be tailored with the use of the EnFORZA framework. 
Should some new specific technology or new law arise, the agency can simply go back and 
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iterate through the framework for special needs or an adaptation. This is certainly true with 
changing laws. As more cases like Fricosu and the San Bernardino case illustrates, as 
technology changes so will the crimes in which it is used. The laws associated with those 
crimes, as well as, domestic intelligence will also adapt to a changing technological 
environment. The proposed framework provides a level of flexibility to the agencies and 
organizations that can utilize it.   
Another implication for the use of this framework are agency interoperations and aid 
agreements. In many instances, agencies do not have the necessary means to investigate a 
computer seized, let alone one that is encrypted. In using this framework, an agency will be 
able to identify various weaknesses in the technical or legal capabilities of the organization. 
This can spawn partnerships with other agencies or entities with these capabilities or lead to 
mutual training opportunities. The primary notion will be the identification of these 
weaknesses then turn to other agencies for assistance. This is already an accepted practice on 
any number of law enforcement practices in the United States and is the common supporting 
theme in task forces. Without understanding the inherent agency weakness though, assistance 
will be difficult to obtain or even misapplied. 
The identification of weaknesses will also lead to training opportunities. Once a 
weakness in capability is identified, seeking training and funding for training should be an 
outcome. As an example, if an agency has identified a weakness in the live forensics 
processes considerations, then seminar or continuing education should become a priority for 
officers or agents. If the organization has a weakness in identifying business or third party 
considerations, the same would apply, but perhaps the business or vendor can offer insight for 
law enforcement.  
Additionally, the artifact can be used to assist prosecution in the preparing of legal 
motions. As an example, if the prosecution has motions partially prepared ahead of the most 
common encryption defenses, then time and resources can be saved in the process. This also 
helps defense counsel or public defenders in the plea arrangements that are commonly made. 
By having a standard and being prepped with legal assistance, law enforcement can expedite 
the time needed to file charges and bring the case to adjudication. 
Lastly, the artifact can assist law enforcement and prosecution in the mitigation of risk 
related to the admissibility of evidence. The United States legal system has very strict rules on 
45 
what constitutes evidence and how it can be used in a legal proceeding. Those rules are 
beyond the scope of this discussion, but having the legal assistance as part of the framework is 
crucial. Evidence that is not handled properly, or that maintains its legal soundness, can be 
dismissed. Adding to this a layer of complexity of encryption, a technology specifically 
designed to obfuscate information, and the pitfalls of sound evidence become greater. Adding 
legal assistance, best practices, and planning can avoid this issue altogether when dealing with 
whole disk encryption.  
Future Research 
The future of this research will continue the design science iterative process. The 
further refinement and testing of this framework will need to be addressed. The first 
refinement will be the demonstration of the framework with a criminal case at the state level. 
This was hampered by the limitations discussed prior, but if those limitations can be 
overcome, this is the next logical step. If this can be done, it will add to the flexibility already 
demonstrated by expanding the number and nature of criminal cases in the United States. 
Another possible option for further research is the inclusion of media or storage 
beyond traditional hard disk drives. The option of other types of storage including optical 
media, tape media, NAND or flash based storage, are all currently used in devices today. 
Additionally, there should be the expansion of this research to non-traditional computing 
devices, specifically mobile devices. These types of devices are well illustrated by the San 
Bernardino shooting case with Apple and the FBI. Given the wide spread use of mobile as a 
platform for digital communication, there will be more technology and legal challenges 
coming in the future. Being able to apply this framework to those types of storage media and 
mobile devices will also increase the usefulness of the artifact as well as contribute to the 
body of I.S. knowledge. 
In addition to more types of storage and various types of devices, having a research 
partnership with practitioners might improve the validity of the artifact. If a research can 
partner with a digital forensics practitioner on criminal cases, or gleam some type of feedback 
through the iterative process used in design science research, there will be an improvement 
both in the usefulness of the artifact as well as a reduction in researcher bias. This type of 




What is certain about the nature of this research is that the calls for furthering it were 
founded and substantiated. The use of encryption is both a necessity for data protection and a 
hindering technology to law enforcement. Technology will change and encryption will 
continue to improve for consumer use. As such, law enforcement must be able to adapt to 
uphold law and investigate criminal activity while at the same time supporting personal 
privacy. Further research needs to be done on behalf of practitioners, specifically law 
enforcement that strengthening investigations and privacy. Frameworks, methods, and models 
can assist by providing practitioners the much needed tools for adapting to changing 
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